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Abstract: This paper attempts to shed light on three related issues that bear di-
rectly on our understanding of Locke and Kant. The first is whether Kant believes
Locke merely anticipates his distinction between analytic and synthetic judg-
ments or also believes Locke anticipates his notion of synthetic a priori cogni-
tion. The second is what we as readers of Kant and Locke should think about
Kant’s view whatever it turns out to be, and the third is the nature of Kant’s jus-
tification for the comparison he draws between his philosophy and Locke’s. I
argue (1) that Kant believes Locke anticipates both the analytic-synthetic distinc-
tion and Kant’s notion of synthetic a priori cognition, (2) that the best justifica-
tion for Kant’s claim draws on Locke’s distinction between trifling and instruc-
tive knowledge, (3) that the arguments against this claim developed by
Carson, Allison, and Newman fail to undermine it, and (4) that Kant’s own jus-
tification for his claim is quite different from what many commentators have
thought it was (or should have been).
Introduction
Kant’s relationship to his empiricist predecessors is complex, and this complex-
ity is perhaps no more evident than in the case of Locke, whose philosophy in-
fluenced not only the likes of Berkeley, Hume, and Reid but also a generation of
Kant’s German predecessors.¹ The “famous Locke” is the first philosopher Kant
mentions in the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), but he is also critical of Locke’s
“physiology of the human understanding” and contrasts his transcendental de-
Citations from the Critique of Pure Reason use the standard A/B format to refer to the pages of
the first (A) and second (B) editions. Citations from Kant’s other works use the volume number
and pagination of Kants gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Royal Prussian (later German, then
Berlin-Brandenburg) Academy of the Sciences.  vols. (Berlin: De Gruyter —). Quotations
from Kant are taken from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, in some cases
with slight modifications. All other translations are my own. Citations from Locke’s Essay
Concerning Human Understanding (Essay) give the book, chapter, and section numbers and
follow the Nidditch edition.
 See Pollok (), the literature cited therein, and Beiser (, –) for discussion of
Locke’s influence on eighteenth-century German philosophy.
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duction of the pure concepts of the understanding with Locke’s attempted empir-
ical deduction of them (CPR A ix, A x and B 127).² Elsewhere, however, Kant is far
more complimentary of Locke. For he claims in a number of places that Locke’s
Essay Concerning Human Understanding contains a hint of the distinction be-
tween synthetic and analytic judgments, and in the Prolegomena he appears
to claim that Locke even anticipates his notion of synthetic a priori cognition.³
Given the importance of these distinctions to Kant’s epistemology, this is high
praise indeed.
Commenters are in general agreement that Kant believes Locke anticipates
the analytic-synthetic distinction, but they disagree about whether he endorses
the further claim that Locke anticipates his notion of synthetic a priori cogni-
tion.⁴ There is also disagreement about which, if either, of these views is true
as a thesis about Locke and Kant, independent of what Kant may understand
his relationship to Locke to be.⁵ Finally, on the assumption that Kant endorses
the stronger claim that Locke anticipates both the analytic-synthetic distinction
and his notion of synthetic a priori cognition, an assumption I shall argue is cor-
rect, questions have been raised about Kant’s justification for this claim and, in
particular, about why he does not appeal to the Lockean distinction between tri-
fling and instructive knowledge, a distinction that I shall argue provides good
evidence for the stronger claim.⁶
My goal in this paper is to shed light on this difficult set of issues and, in the
process, on the relationship between Locke and Kant. In section one, I argue that
Kant’s comments about Locke suggest he believes Locke anticipates both the an-
alytic-synthetic distinction and the notion of synthetic a priori cognition. In sec-
tion two, I present what I take to be the best justification for this claim by com-
 See Guyer () for a discussion of Kant and Locke on this point.
 See Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that may come forward as a science (hereafter, Pro-
legomena) AA :; On a discovery whereby any new critique of pure reason is to be made super-
fluous by an older one (hereafter, On a discovery) AA :; and R  dated to –. I
return to these passages in section one.
 Beck (, ) and Cicovacki (, ) hold that Kant endorses the stronger view, as does
Guyer in Kant (, , n), while Ayers (, ) suggests Kant endorses only the weaker
view.
 Fraser in the annotations contained in Locke (: II, , ); Gibson (, ); and
Ryle (,  ff.) suggest the stronger view is true, while Caird (,  f.) and Ewing (,
) suggest only the weaker view is true. Carson (, ) assumes the truth of the strong
view for the purposes of her paper, but her criticisms of Locke make clear that she would
only endorse the weaker view, while Allison (, ) and Newman (, –) reject
both views.
 See Beck (, ) and Cicovacki (, ).
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paring these Kantian distinctions to Locke’s distinction between trifling and in-
structive knowledge. In section three, I consider three arguments against the
claim that instructive knowledge meets the criteria Kant lays out for synthetic
a priori cognition and argue that each is unsatisfactory. In section four, I identify
Kant’s justification for the claim that Locke anticipates his notion of synthetic a
priori cognition and argue that it is plausible but different in important ways
from the justification presented in section two. In particular, while the justifica-
tion I provide and which many of Kant’s commentators believe he should have
provided draws heavily on Locke’s account of mathematical judgment, Kant’s ac-
tual justification ignores Locke’s account of mathematical judgment completely
and focuses instead on claims he makes about body and the mechanics of bodily
motion.While the strongest argument that can be made on Kant’s behalf for the
claim that Locke anticipates his notion of synthetic a priori cognition relies on
Locke’s trifling-instructive distinction and his use of mathematical judgments
to illustrate that distinction, the best reconstruction of Kant’s justification for
this claim relies, surprisingly in my view, on similarities between a claim
Locke makes about motion and arguments Kant develops in the Metaphysical
Foundations of Natural Science.
1 Kant’s comments on Locke
Although Kant credits Hume in the Prolegomena with striking a spark he will
later kindle, there is no indication there or elsewhere that he believes Hume an-
ticipates his notion of synthetic a priori cognition and only the passing sugges-
tion that he believes Hume anticipates the analytic-synthetic distinction.⁷ With
Locke, however, there is good reason to think Kant believes he anticipates
both. Kant discusses Locke in a number of places, but only three of them bear
directly on the question at hand:
Locke saw the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments in his essay concern-
ing human understanding. (AA 17:278)
By contrast I find a hint [Wink] of this division [between analytic and synthetic judgments]
already in Locke’s essays on human understanding. For in Book IV, Chapter III, §9 f., after
he had already discussed the various connections of representations in judgments and the
sources of the connections, of which he located the one in identity or contradiction (ana-
lytic judgments) but the other in the existence of representations in a subject (synthetic
 See AA : and CPR A /B .
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judgments), he then acknowledges in §10 that our cognition (a priori) of these last is very
restricted and almost nothing at all. (AA 4:270)
In order to be satisfied of this, we have only to examine the examples that have been pre-
viously introduced [die man bisher angeführt hat] to prove that the distinction in question
[between analytic and synthetic judgments] is already known and fully developed in phi-
losophy, albeit under other names. The first one (pointed out by myself, though only as
somewhat like it) is from Locke, who assigns what he calls cognition of coexistence to judg-
ments of experience, and cognition of relation to moral judgments; but he does not give a
name to the synthetic aspect of judgments in general; nor, by this distinction from propo-
sitions of identity, has he extracted the most minimal of general rules for pure a priori cog-
nition as such. (AA 8:245, translation modified)
The first of these passages is a note Kant made in the 1760s to his copy of Baum-
garten’s Metaphysica, and it claims unambiguously that Locke anticipates the
analytic-synthetic distinction. Unfortunately, it tells us nothing about whether
Kant also thought Locke anticipates the notion of the synthetic a priori since it
was written at a time when Kant thought that all synthetic cognition was a pos-
teriori.
The second passage is from the Prolegomena. It is part of the first paragraph
of the section of the Preface entitled “Note on the general division of judgments
into analytic and synthetic”. Here we find a weaker version of Kant’s claim in the
reflection from the 1760s (instead of simply ‘seeing’ the analytic-synthetic dis-
tinction, Locke is only credited with ‘hinting’ at it), but he also refers us to pas-
sages of the Essay that he believes verify not only this weaker claim but also the
additional claim that some of Locke’s proto-synthetic judgments are known a
priori. Although Kant only includes the phrase “a priori” in parentheses, the
view we find in the Prolegomena is that Book IV, Chapter III of Locke’s Essay con-
tains an account of something like the analytic-synthetic distinction and that
Locke there acknowledges the existence of something like synthetic a priori judg-
ments.
The third passage is from On a discovery, a piece published in 1790 to coun-
ter the Wolffian attack on Kant’s philosophy mounted chiefly by Johann August
Eberhard, and must be interpreted with great care.⁸ At first glance, it appears
that Kant is simply citing Locke as evidence that the analytic-synthetic distinc-
tion was “already known and fully developed in philosophy, albeit under
other names” before the Critique and making a passing reference to his having
already noted this seven years earlier in the Prolegomena (“pointed out by my-
 For a detailed discussion of the Kant-Eberhard controversy, see Allison ().
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self, though only as somewhat like it”). But the dialectical situation of this pas-
sage is more complex than this reading would suggest.
In one of the essays to which On a discovery is a response, Eberhard chal-
lenges the originality of Kant’s analytic-synthetic distinction by arguing that it
amounts to nothing more than the Wolffian distinction between identical and
non-identical judgments. And in the pages surrounding the passage we have
quoted, Kant wants to show against Eberhard (a) that the analytic-synthetic dis-
tinction is not identical to the identical-non-identical distinction and (b) that the
analytic-synthetic distinction was first properly formulated in the Critique. It is
against the background of these arguments that he makes reference to Locke.
Kant’s argument for (b) is a counterfactual modus tollens. Had the analytic-
synthetic distinction been properly formulated before the Critique, debate about
the possibility of a priori knowledge, which had been going on at least since the
time of Locke,would have immediately led to debate about the possibility of syn-
thetic a priori knowledge, at which point it would have become obvious that “the
success or failure of metaphysics depends entirely on how the latter problem
might come to be resolved”, and all metaphysicians would have suspended
their work until the guiding question of the Critique had been answered (AA
8:244). But since metaphysicians have not suspended their work and no one be-
fore Kant considered how synthetic a priori judgments are possible, the analytic-
synthetic distinction was not properly formulated until the Critique.
Kant’s argument for (a) is more complex, but the general idea is that the
identical-non-identical distinction is different from the analytic-synthetic dis-
tinction because the concept of synthesis naturally suggests the idea that a
“third thing” (i.e. intuition) is required to make synthetic a priori judgment pos-
sible, whereas the concept of merely being non-identical does not.⁹ Since the
identical-non-identical distinction does not naturally suggest this idea, the in-
sight that intuition is required for synthetic cognition and, more importantly,
that a priori intuition is required for synthetic a priori cognition “could not be
expected through the characterization of synthetic judgments as non-identical,
and has never in fact resulted from it” (AA 8:245, second italics mine).
It is in the service of supporting this latter claim—i.e. that characterizing
synthetic judgments as non-identical has in fact never led anyone to the realiza-
tion that intuition is a necessary condition of the possibility of these judgments
in general and a priori intuition a necessary condition of the possibility of syn-
thetic a priori judgments—that Kant makes his third reference to Locke.With this
 I shall speak of ‘intuition’ when discussing Kantian Anschauung and of ‘intuitive knowledge’
or ‘intuitions’ when discussing features of Locke’s account of knowledge.
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context in mind, the first thing to note is that the “this” we are to satisfy our-
selves of in the passage is the historical claim just cited. That is, if we look at
the examples “previously introduced” we will see that in no case did anyone
who understood what Kant calls the analytic-synthetic distinction in terms of
the distinction between identical and non-identical judgments realize that intu-
ition was necessary for synthetic judgments or that a priori intuition was neces-
sary for synthetic a priori ones. And the first example that was “previously intro-
duced” is Locke.
At this point, however, it becomes clear that Kant is not speaking in propria
persona since, first, he does not claim in the Prolegomena or, indeed, anywhere
else, that Locke or anyone has “fully developed” the analytic-synthetic distinc-
tion and, second, it would undermine his efforts to defend the originality of
this distinction against Eberhard’s criticism if he were to make this claim now.
Rather, what Kant is doing in the first sentence of the passage is referencing
the following passage from Eberhard’s essay:
It is only in Locke’s Essays on human understanding that Mr. Kant finds a hint [Wink] of this
division. A follower and commenter of the Königsberg philosopher has, however, subse-
quent to Kant found this entire distinction exhaustively presented [völlig ausführlich ange-
zeigt] in §260 of Dr. Crusius’ Path to certainty and reliability in human cognition; and it is
not little worthy of note, that such an acute dogmatist as Crusius could not be healed of his
firm and far-reaching dogmatism by deep acquaintance with this distinction.¹⁰
The examples Kant refers to in On a discovery are thus not in the first instance
ones that he has given but rather ones Eberhard discusses in the essays to which
Kant is responding,which is why Kant includes the parenthetical comment in the
passage to indicate, first, that in contrast to the other examples “previously
cited” which he did not cite as forerunners to the analytic-synthetic distinction,
he did cite the example from Locke he discusses and, second, that in contrast to
the suggestion by Eberhard and others that the analytic-synthetic distinction was
“fully developed” in Locke, he believes that Locke’s distinction was only “some-
what like” his (AA 8:245).
We are now in a position to judge the bearing of our third passage on the
question at hand. In the note from the 1760s, Kant claims that Locke “saw”
the analytic-synthetic distinction, and in the Prolegomena, Kant repeats a version
of this claim and makes the additional claim that some of Locke’s proto-synthet-
 The quotation is from Eberhard (b, ), reprinted in Kant (b, ). Kant’s subse-
quent reference to Reusch in the continuation of the passage from On a discovery is evidently to
Eberhard (a, ), also reprinted in Kant (b, ). The ‘commentator’ Eberhard refers to
is Carl Christian Erhard Schmid.
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ic judgments are also known a priori. The passage from On a discovery is, on the
whole, consistent with the other two passages and thus consistent with attribut-
ing the strong reading to Kant. It reasserts the qualified view of the Prolegomena
that a “hint” of the analytic-synthetic distinction can be found in Locke, and
while it is silent on the question of whether Locke recognizes anything like syn-
thetic a priori cognition, its dialectical context explains this silence. Kant’s goal
in this and the surrounding passages of On a discovery is to build a case against
Eberhard’s claim that the analytic-synthetic distinction is not a novel one, and
his discussion of Locke is in the service of building this case. That he does
not return to all the issues about Locke he addresses in the Prolegomena is of
course disappointing, since we might have liked to hear more about which Lock-
ean judgments are like Kantian a priori ones, but his silence is not a reason to
think his view has changed since 1783. On the whole, then, Kant’s comments
about Locke suggest that he believes Locke anticipates both the analytic-synthet-
ic distinction and the notion of synthetic a priori cognition.
2 Evaluating Kant’s Claim
If Kant believes that Locke anticipates both the analytic-synthetic distinction and
his notion of synthetic a priori cognition, it is natural to ask whether he is right
to do so. To answer this question, however, we must first say more about the an-
alytic-synthetic distinction in general and Kant’s notion of synthetic a priori cog-
nition in particular. Since these distinctions are among the most complex in
Kant’s philosophy, my discussion of them is intended to provide a general orien-
tation not an exhaustive analysis.
In the first Critique and Prolegomena Kant introduces three—and on some
readings four—characterizations of the analytic-synthetic distinction. The first
three of these are: containment vs. non-containment, identity vs. non-identity,
and explicative vs. ampliative. According to the first, a judgment is analytic
when the predicate is ‘contained in’ the subject-concept and synthetic when
the predicate is not so contained. According to the second, a judgment is analytic
when the predicate is identical to part or all of the subject-concept and synthetic
when the predicate is not identical to any part of the subject. According to the
third, a judgment is analytic when it merely clarifies existing cognition by mak-
ing the content of our concepts explicit and synthetic when it amplifies or ex-
tends our knowledge. These criteria are not coextensive, and Kant’s view
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about which is central appears to change over the course of the critical period.¹¹
In these works, however, Kant also claims that analytic judgments “rest” on or
are “cognizable” through the principle of contradiction, and these claims are
sometimes thought to be an additional criterion of analyticity.¹² As recent com-
mentators have observed, however, there is good reason to believe that Kant is
not providing a fourth criterion of analyticity in these passages but simply mak-
ing a claim about how analytic judgments (or their truth) can be known.¹³
In the A edition of the Critique, Kant introduces the notion of the a priori by
way of three concepts (necessity, strict universality, and independence from ex-
perience) that he subsequently treats separately in the B edition. Here Kant’s
view is that necessity and universality are “sure indications” of a priori cogni-
tion, but his official definition of a priori cognition is in terms of independence
from experience: “[…] we will understand by a priori cognitions those that occur
absolutely independently of all experience” (CPR B 3–4). Kant cannot mean ex-
actly what he says here, however, since he proceeds to distinguish pure a priori
judgments in which “nothing empirical is intermixed” from a priori judgments
involving concepts such as ‘alteration’, ‘body’, or ‘gold’, which can “be drawn
only from experience” (CPR B 3; cf. AA 4:267).¹⁴ Since some a priori judgments
involve empirical concepts, it is generally recognized that the relevant sense of
independence invoked by Kant in his characterization of a priori knowledge is
justificatory: a judgment is a priori just in case its justification requires no expe-
rience other than that sufficient for the acquisition of the concepts involved in
the judgment. And while this formulation is also problematic in certain ways,
it will suffice for our purposes.¹⁵
Within Locke’s epistemology, the distinction that most closely parallels the
Kantian ones we have been discussing is that between trifling and instructive
 As I have formulated them here, for example, the first and second criteria only apply to af-
firmative judgments (e.g. ‘All bodies are extended’). A more complete formulation of these cri-
teria would allow for negative analytic judgments as well. I have not provided such a formula-
tion, despite the fact that Kant clearly holds there are negative analytic judgments, for two
reasons: () Kant’s initial discussion of the analytic-synthetic distinction in the first Critique con-
siders only affirmative judgments, and () Locke’s examples of trifling and instructive proposi-
tions are all affirmative. For different accounts of which of these criteria is central and at what
point in Kant’s development, see Anderson (; ) and Proops ().
 See CPR A /B  and AA :. Both Van Cleve (, ) and Hanna (, )
argue that cognizability through the principle of contradiction is Kant’s central criterion of an-
alyticity.
 See Anderson () and Proops ().
 Kitcher (, ) and Anderson (, ) note this point.
 See Kitcher (, ).
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knowledge, and it is the latter that many commentators have suggested antici-
pates Kant’s notion of synthetic a priori cognition.¹⁶ To understand this distinc-
tion, however, we must first say something about Locke’s account of knowledge,
since knowledge is the larger epistemological category under which trifling and
instructive knowledge falls.
Locke holds that knowledge gives us the “utmost light and greatest certain-
ty” our cognitive faculties are capable of and that it consists in the “perception of
the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our
ideas” (Essay 4.2.1 and 4.1.1). There are four kinds of agreement and disagree-
ment—identity/diversity, co-existence or necessary connection, relation, and
real existence—and the manner in which each kind is perceived determines
which of three kinds or “degrees” of knowledge a particular perception consti-
tutes: intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive (Essay 4.1.3 and 4.2.1–2,14).
For our purposes, only the first two kinds of knowledge are important. Intui-
tive knowledge consists in the immediate perception of agreement or disagree-
ment and is the “clearest and most certain” knowledge we can possess, while de-
monstrative knowledge consists in the perception of agreement or disagreement
of two ideas mediated through one or more intervening ideas (Essay 4.2.1). Locke
calls these intervening ideas proofs or mediums, and the combination of these
ideas and those they connect is a demonstration. In demonstrative knowledge,
then, the agreement or disagreement cannot be perceived by considering the
two ideas alone but requires the mediation of other ideas. Since the connection
between proofs is always intuitive, the certainty of these intuitions is transferred
to the demonstration they constitute.
 In addition to the relevant citations in footnotes five and six, see Woolhouse (, ) and
Jolley (,  f.). One might object to the implicit identification these authors and I make
between Lockean knowledge and Kantian cognition (Erkenntnis) on the grounds that Kant be-
lieves it is possible for cognitions to be false, while Locke regards knowledge as necessarily
true (CPR A /B ). Indeed, it is in part because Kant allows for false Erkenntnisse that
many translators prefer to render ‘Erkenntnis’ and its cognates as ‘cognition’ in the first Critique
and elsewhere. Moreover, it is certainly true that cognition or even true cognition does not entail
knowledge (Wissen) in Kant’s view, for which are also required taking-to-be-true (Fürwahrhal-
ten), subjective sufficient for belief or ‘conviction’ (Überzeugung), and ‘certainty’ (Gewissheit)
(CPR A /B ). In the case of a priori theoretical cognition, however, cognition does entail
knowledge both in the sense that it justifies and guarantees our adoption of the particular form
of holding-to-be-true that for Kant is knowledge. While there are certainly differences between
Lockean knowledge and Kantian cognition, then, they are not great enough in the case of the
cognition at issue here to raise suspicions about the view I am presenting. For discussion of
Kant’s taxonomy of doxastic attitudes, see Stevenson (), Chignell (), and Pasternack
().
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Propositions are the “joining or separating of signs”, whether these signs are
mental as in the case of ideas or verbal as in the case of words, so the percep-
tions of agreement or disagreement among ideas that constitute knowledge are
also de facto propositions (Essay 4.5.2). Locke divides these propositions into two
sorts: trifling and instructive. The former “add no light to our understandings”
and “bring no increase to our knowledge” because they either “affirm the
same term of itsself” or predicate part of a complex idea “of the name of the
whole” (Essay 4.8.1–4).¹⁷ The proposition ‘White is white’ is trifling by the first
criterion, and the proposition ‘Lead is a metal’ is trifling by the second. Instruc-
tive propositions “affirm something of another, which is a necessary conse-
quence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it”, and we come to
know them by means of demonstration (Essay 4.8.8). The dependence of instruc-
tive knowledge on demonstration is emphasized in Locke’s initial contrast of the
two forms of knowledge:
Instruction lies in something very different, and he that would enlarge his own, or anoth-
er’s Mind, to Truths he does not yet know, must find out intermediate Ideas, and then lay
them in such order one by another, that the Understanding may see the agreement, or dis-
agreement of those in question. Propositions that do this, are instructive […] (Essay 4.8.3)
So instructive propositions express kinds of agreement or disagreement among
ideas that the ideas do not, as it were, wear on their sleeves and that therefore
require proofs or mediums in order to be perceived. Locke’s examples of these
propositions are typically geometrical, such as the proposition “the external
angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the opposite internal angles”, but
he believes many of the propositions of moral philosophy are also instructive
in this sense (Essay 4.8.8).¹⁸
If we suppose that containment is the central criterion of analyticity, the tri-
fling-instructive distinction does appear to anticipate the analytic-synthetic dis-
tinction. Synthetic judgments ascribe predicates to objects that are not contained
in our concepts of those objects, while analytic judgments ascribe predicates that
are contained in these concepts; and instructive propositions ascribe predicates
to objects that are not contained on our ideas of them, while trifling propositions
ascribe objects that are contained in these ideas. The same is true if we suppose
 Locke also says a proposition is trifling when it “predicate[s] any other part of a definition of
the term defined” (Essay ..). Since a definition is simply a complex idea associated with a
particular word, however, this class of trifling propositions is a subset of the second I have listed
here.
 On the connection to moral philosophy, see Essay ..– and ..–.
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that identity is the central criterion of analyticity. Synthetic judgments ascribe
predicates to objects that are not identical to any part of the concepts of those
objects, while analytic judgments ascribe predicates to objects that are identical
or partially identical to our concepts of those objects; and instructive proposi-
tions ascribe predicates to objects that are not identical to any part of our
ideas of them, while trifling propositions express relations of identity among
ideas, either total in the case of propositions such as ‘White is white’ or partial
in the case of propositions such as ‘Lead is metal’.
The situation changes only slightly if we suppose that explication is the cen-
tral criterion of analyticity. Some trifling propositions cease to anticipate analytic
judgments if analyticity is construed in terms of explication, but the similarity
between synthetic judgments and instructive propositions and the argument in
favor of believing that instructive propositions anticipate synthetic a priori judg-
ments remain intact. Synthetic judgments augment our knowledge because they
“add to the concept a predicate that was not thought in it at all” and “could not
have been extracted from it by any analysis”, while instructive propositions aug-
ment our knowledge by ascribing a predicate to a subject that is not contained in
our idea of it (CPR A 7/B 11). In at least one place, however, Kant denies that
purely identical propositions are analytic on the grounds that they do not expli-
cate or analyze their ideas (AA 20:322).¹⁹ So if explication is the central criterion
of analyticity for Kant, only the second class of trifling propositions, those that
predicate part of a complex idea or definition of the whole, will anticipate ana-
lytic judgments. Still, this is quite a large class of propositions, so the case for the
claim that Locke anticipates both the analytic-synthetic distinction and the no-
tion of synthetic a priori cognition would be weakened only slightly if it turned
out that explication was more central to Kantian analyticity than containment or
identity.
Moreover, on each of these criteria, there is good reason to believe that in-
structive propositions anticipate synthetic a priori judgments.While Locke’s con-
cept empiricism prevents any knowledge from being ‘pure’ in Kant’s sense, in-
structive propositions are a priori in the other relevant senses. Since they
involve the comparison of ideas through demonstrations, they are a priori in
the justificatory sense; and since they ascribe predicates to a subject that are
“necessary consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it
(Essay 4.8.8, first emphasis mine),” they exhibit the first of the two “sure indica-
tions” of apriority (CPR B 4). Moreover, there is reason to think they exhibit the
second one as well. For while there are some kinds of Lockean knowledge (e.g.
 This is another instance in which Kant’s criteria are not coextensive. See note  above.
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sensitive knowledge) that are not strictly universal in the sense Kant describes, it
is clear that mathematical propositions—Locke’s paradigmatic instance of in-
structive knowledge—are universal in this sense.²⁰
So regardless of which criterion we focus on, there is good reason to believe
that Locke’s trifling-instructive distinction anticipates Kant’s analytic-synthetic
distinction, and there is a straightforward sense in which instructive proposi-
tions anticipate synthetic a priori ones as well. Moreover, although I cannot
fully defend this claim here, there is good reason to believe that containment
is the central criterion of analyticity for Kant, and it is on this criterion that
the distinctions turn out to be most similar.²¹
3 Objections to Kant’s Claim
Despite its intuitive appeal, the suggestion that Lockean instructive knowledge
anticipates Kantian synthetic a priori cognition has been subject to a number
of objections. Emily Carson (2002) has denied that instructive knowledge antici-
pates synthetic a priori cognition on the grounds that the former is not in fact a
priori. Henry Allison (2008) has argued that the trifling-instructive distinction
does not anticipate analytic-synthetic distinction because some trifling proposi-
tions are synthetic, and Lex Newman (2007) has argued that, properly under-
stood, both trifling and instructive propositions are analytic. In what follows, I
consider each of these objections in turn.
To evaluate Carson’s objection, we must first say a bit more about why Locke
believes mathematical propositions are not empirical. According to Locke, these
propositions are not empirical because they are propositions about modes.
Modes are modifications of one or more simple ideas that do not include the
idea of “subsisting by themselves” and are thought to be “dependencies on,
 A judgment is strictly universal for Kant when it is thought in such a way that “no exception
at all is allowed to be possible” (CPR B ).
 In addition to the historical considerations Anderson (; ) cites, one should note,
first, that Kant begins his discussion of the analytic-synthetic distinction in both the A and B
editions of the first Critique with the containment criterion and, second, that he consistently
uses this criterion to clarify his notion of analyticity and defend the originality of his analyt-
ic-synthetic distinction in On a discovery. See AA :–. I note in passing that claiming
Locke anticipates either the analytic-synthetic distinction or the notion of synthetic a priori cog-
nition is obviously not the same as claiming that Locke has a fully developed notion of either in
the Kantian sense. Consequently, Kant’s instance in On a discovery and elsewhere that he was
the first to fully develop the distinction is not in tension either with the passages examined
in section one or with the argument of this section.
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or affections of substances” (Essay 2.12.4). In addition, modes are voluntary cre-
ations of the mind, and it is because of this that they occupy a special place in
Locke’s theory of ideas: they are one of the two kinds of ideas whose real and
nominal essences coincide (Essay 3.5.14). As Locke puts it, “a figure including
a space between three lines, is the real, as well as the nominal essence of a tri-
angle” because it is not only “the abstract idea to which the general term is an-
nexed” but also “that foundation from which all its properties flow” (Essay
3.3.18). If there is any object answering to our idea of a triangle, we can be
sure that any of its external angles will be greater than either of the opposite in-
ternal angles, not because it is part of our abstract idea (the nominal essence) of
a triangle that its angles stand in this relation but because we discover that the
idea of “a figure including a space between three lines” agrees in equality with
the idea of an object each of whose external angles is greater than either of the
opposite internal angles. This agreement is discovered merely by comparing our
ideas, so its justification is not empirical. Since what is discovered is a property
that “flows from” the real essence of the triangle and, given the identity of modal
real and nominal essences, is also a “necessary consequence” our idea of trian-
gle “but not contained in it”, the proposition expressing this agreement is also
instructive (Essay 3.3.18 and 4.8.8).
Locke uses geometrical examples to argue that mathematical knowledge is
instructive and suggests that his argument can be generalized to apply to
moral knowledge as well (Essay 4.4.6–7).²² So any weakness in his argument
for the instructiveness of geometrical propositions will threaten to undermine
his account of instructive knowledge in general. Carson believes there is such
a weakness in the origin of our simple idea of space. Locke maintains that we
acquire this idea through sensation. Given this origin, Carson argues that
Locke cannot claim that our ideas of spatial figures such as triangles are entirely
creations of the mind since the features of our simple idea of space constrain the
ways in which it can be modified to produce ideas of such figures. In particular,
she argues that it is these features that give content to our ideas of spatial figures
over and above the content included in our ideas of them and make it possible
for us to have instructive knowledge of them.²³ To the extent that geometrical
propositions are instructive, then, they must also be empirical; and to the extent
 What Locke argues in these passages is that mathematical and moral claims are instances of
real knowledge, but he makes clear at Essay .. that real knowledge is instructive knowledge.
 For example, there is something about the simple idea of space that allows it to be modified
in such a way that we can form the idea of a three-sided closed figure but not a two-sided one;
similarly, there is something about this idea that allows us to form the idea of a three-sided
closed figure whose external angle is greater than its interior angles but not vice versa.
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that they are empirical, they are contingent and, hence, cannot be known a pri-
ori.
It seems to me, however, that this objection is not to the apriority of Lockean
mathematical knowledge but to the applicability of that knowledge to objects en-
countered in experience. For what is contingent about my knowledge of the
modes of space,where these modes are understood to be modifications of an em-
pirically-acquired simple idea of space, is whether the things that are true of
those modes are also true of figures encountered in space. This contingency
might manifest in two ways. On the one hand, it is theoretically possible (al-
though quite unlikely) on Locke’s account for the simple idea of space I acquire
at one time to be different in kind from the idea I acquire at another time; and
were it different, there would be no guarantee that both simple ideas could be
modified in the same way and, hence, no guarantee that the relations among
the ideas of their respective modes would be the same. On the other hand, it
is possible for me to take my empirically-acquired simple idea of space, construct
the mode of a triangle from it, determine through demonstration that its interior
angles are equal to two right angles, which angles are themselves modes con-
structed from the simple idea of space, and nevertheless find no object in the
world that is triangular.²⁴ What is not contingent is the claim that the interior an-
gles of any object will be equal to two right angles if that object answers to my
idea of a triangle. And while the content of this claim is empirical—insofar as it is
about an empirically-acquired idea, the modes of that idea, and what is true
about those modes—the claim itself is still a priori in the justificatory sense out-
lined in the previous section since the only experience necessary to know its
truth is the experience necessary to acquire the simple idea of space.
According to Allison (2008, 68) the trifling-instructive distinction does not
anticipate the analytic-synthetic distinction because some trifling propositions
are synthetic.²⁵ In particular, Allison argues that propositions like ‘Lead is a
 Cf. Essay .. and ..–.
 In Allison (), he also argues that one cannot have a full-blown conception of synthetic
judgments and, hence, a fully Kantian conception of the analytic-synthetic distinction without
also recognizing the complementary roles of concepts and intuitions in cognition, which, he fur-
ther argues, none of Kant’s predecessors did; and he continues to endorse the general outlines
of this view in Allison (). Insofar as Allison means to argue that there is nothing in Kant’s
predecessors, Locke among them, identical to the analytic-synthetic distinction (as opposed to
being importantly similar to it), these views are not objections to the account presented here.
Indeed, Allison (, ) seems to indicate that the way Kant characterizes synthetic judg-
ments in both editions of the first Critique, Prolegomena, and On a discovery does not require
the notion of Kantian intuition. Kant of course does not provide an account of how synthetic
a priori judgments are possible in these passages, and such an account does of course turn
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metal’ and ‘All gold is fusible’ are trifling for Locke but “paradigmatic examples
of the synthetic a posteriori” for Kant (Essay 4.8.4–5).²⁶ But while it is certainly
true that these propositions are trifling for Locke—insofar as they involve the
predication of part of a nominal essence of an object falling under that es-
sence—Allison gives us no reason to think that Kant would have regarded
them as synthetic.²⁷ Moreover, it seems clear that Kant’s attitude toward empiri-
cal concepts is quite Lockean. As we saw in section two, for example, Kant is
happy to regard judgments involving empirical concepts as a priori as long as
nothing empirical is required for the judgment beyond the concepts in question.
Indeed, when he makes this point in the Prolegomena, his example is evocative
of precisely the kinds of propositions Allison claims he regards as “paradigmati-
cally synthetic”:
[…] all analytic propositions are still a priori judgments even if their concepts are empirical,
as in: Gold is a yellow metal; for in order to know this, I need no further experience outside
my concept of gold, which includes that this body is yellow and metal; for this constitutes
my very concept, and I did not have to do anything except analyze it […] (AA 4:267, second
emphasis mine)
If Kant regards the judgment ‘Gold is a yellow metal’ as analytic, it is quite dif-
ficult to see why he would not say the same of the Lockean propositions Allison
cites or, indeed, of trifling propositions in general.
Finally, Lex Newman (2007) has argued that, properly understood, both tri-
fling and instructive propositions are analytic. Newman acknowledges that
Locke’s characterization of instructive knowledge in terms of containment invites
comparison with Kant, but he argues that it is a mistake to suppose that the no-
tions of containment invoked by Locke and Kant are the same. Moreover, he ar-
gues that Locke actually invokes two notions of containment, one that character-
izes both instructive and trifling propositions and another that only characterizes
trifling ones. So while it may appear that the trifling-instructive distinction antic-
ipates the analytic-synthetic distinction, this appearance is due entirely, as Locke
might put it, to verbal identity.
on what Allison calls the discursivity of the human understanding. But since Kant of all people
must allow a distinction between the idea of synthetic a priori cognition and an account of the
possibility of such cognition, it must be possible to have or anticipate the former without being
in possession of the latter.
 Allison (, ).
 Allison (ibid.) includes a footnote referring us to Allison (), but I can find no attempt to
substantiate the present claim in that piece either.
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The first of Locke’s two notions of containment on Newman’s view is idea-
tional containment. One idea is ideationally contained in another just in case
the first is a part (perhaps an improper one) of the second. So if A and B are sim-
ple ideas and AB is a complex idea, then both A and B are contained in AB and
the propositions ‘AB is A’ and ‘AB is B’ will be analytic.²⁸ The second is epistemic
containment. One idea is epistemically contained in another just in case it is ide-
ationally contained in the other and it is already known to be so contained. So if
ABC is a complex idea containing the simple ideas A, B, and C and I know that A
and B are ideationally contained in ABC but do not know that C is ideationally
contained in ABC, then A and B will be both ideationally and epistemically con-
tained in ABC, while C will only be ideationally contained in ABC. Nevertheless,
ideational containment suffices for analyticity, so the propositions ‘ABC is A’,
‘ABC is B’, and ‘ABC is C’ will all be analytic.With this distinction in place, New-
man argues that trifling propositions express epistemic containment relations
among their component ideas, while instructive propositions express ideational
containment relations among their component ideas. Since ideational contain-
ment suffices for analyticity, however, both kinds of propositions turn out to
be analytic.
In my view, however, this cannot be correct. To be sure, Locke does allow
that our ideas may have content that is unrecognized or unknown to the person
possessing the idea, so there is a sense in which he recognizes something like
Newman’s notion of epistemic containment; but this distinction is not relevant
to the way Locke draws the trifling-instructive distinction. First, the cases
Locke discusses of a person recognizing or knowing only part of the content
of an idea she has, such as the passage from the solution to the Molyneux prob-
lem Newman cites, all concern ideas of sensation. And we should be wary of ap-
plying what Locke says about these ideas to ideas of reflection, which are the
ideas whose agreement or disagreement is most often at issue in knowable prop-
ositions.²⁹ Second, on Locke’s official view at least, it does not seem possible for
our ideas of modes to have any content of which we are not aware since these
ideas are voluntary creations of the mind.³⁰ And since of all the ideas modes
 Newman (, ) emphasizes that ideational containment expands the notion of con-
tainment to include particular as well as general propositions.
 Newman (, ) cites the passage at Essay .., but one could also include the discus-
sion of selective attention in the previous sections. I say “most often” because knowable agree-
ments of real existence do involve ideas of sensation, such as my knowledge of the existence of
external things. See Essay, ..–.
 So it could not be true of, say, my idea of a triangle, that there was some idea contained in it
of which I have never been aware. Surely, when I formed the complex idea I associate with ‘tri-
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loom largest in Locke’s discussion of instructive propositions, the notion that a
person might have an idea of a mode and yet be unaware of some of its content
cannot play a role in Locke’s characterization of instructive knowledge.
Moreover, while Locke does indeed characterize trifling propositions in epis-
temic terms, this does not strike me as evidence that he is working with a pecu-
liarly epistemic notion of containment above and beyond whatever other notion
of containment he may employ but merely that he is contrasting propositions
that do not expand our knowledge (trifling propositions) with propositions
that do (instructive propositions).³¹ This language is certainly consistent with
Newman’s reading, but since the trifling-instructive distinction is an epistemic
one on any reading, Locke’s use of this language does not, at least by itself, con-
stitute evidence for this reading. Further, when it comes time to specify the fea-
ture of propositions in virtue of which they are instructive as opposed to trifling,
Locke eschews all epistemic language and says that these propositions “affirm
something of another [object] which is a necessary consequence of its precise
complex idea but not contained in it” (Essay 4.8.8). If the absence of merely epis-
temic containment were the distinguishing feature of instructive propositions as
Newman believes,we would expect Locke to say that the idea affirmed of the ob-
ject was not known to be contained in the idea of the object. That he does not
suggests that it is the absence of containment in general, what Newman calls ide-
ational containment, and not merely of epistemic containment that characterizes
instructive propositions. In short, Locke’s use of epistemic language is not evi-
dence for Newman’s thesis, and Locke’s failure to use epistemic language in
his characterization of instructive knowledge is evidence against it.
4 Kant’s Justification for his Claim
The argument of sections one and two is therefore correct. Kant holds that Locke
anticipated the analytic-synthetic distinction and also the notion of synthetic a
angle’ and with the vocal utterances associated with that word, I knew all of its constituent
ideas. After all, its formation was completely voluntary. Further, if I at any point modify this
idea by adding or subtracting ideas, I will surely know these ideas as well. This point is of course
consistent with Locke’s view that demonstrations of mathematical propositions yield instructive
knowledge (i.e. knowledge of the necessary relations among ideas that are not merely a conse-
quence of their containment relations) since demonstrations reveal agreement or disagreement
among ideas that is not intuitively knowable and such agreement and disagreement is a broader
category than containment.
 Newman (, –) cites Essay .. and .. as instances of this characterization.
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priori cognition, and Locke’s distinction between trifling and instructive knowl-
edge provides a strong basis for this claim. Nevertheless, it is not at all clear
whether Kant’s justification for this claim is the same as the one given in section
two. Indeed, two of his more sympathetic commentators on this subject, Beck
(1978, 82) and Cicovacki (1990, 513), claim that he was unaware of the similarities
between instructive knowledge and synthetic a priori cognition we identified in
that section. Cicovacki gives two reasons for this. The first is that Kant’s com-
ments at AA 4:268 in the Prolegomena, which he liked enough to include verba-
tim in the second edition of the Critique (cf. CPR B 14), suggest that he believes
he is the first person to hold that mathematical propositions are synthetic a pri-
ori. The second is that the only text in which Kant explicitly mentions Locke’s
views on mathematics suggests that Kant believes mathematical propositions
are empirical for Locke.
If Kant was unaware of the similarities between instructive knowledge and
synthetic a priori cognition, however, it is not for the reasons Cicovacki claims.
The “empiricism” Kant refers to in the second text Cicovacki cites concerns the
origin of mathematical concepts not the status of mathematical judgments, so
it is consistent with ascribing to Locke an a priori account of the latter.³² As
for the first passage, the comment Cicovacki likely has in mind is Kant’s claim
that the synthetic nature of mathematical judgments “appears to have complete-
ly escaped the observations of analysts of human reason” (Prolegomena, AA
4:268). On its face, however, this comment suggests only that Kant regards him-
self as the first to claim that mathematical judgments are synthetic not that they
are synthetic a priori; and while Kant clearly holds the latter claim as well, the
view this comment implicitly attributes to the “analysts of human reason” is
that mathematical judgments are not synthetic. That Kant means to attribute
the latter claim to the “analysts” is clear from the continuation of the passage,
in which he writes that because these analysts “found that the inferences of
mathematicians all proceed in accordance with the principle of contradiction
[…] they were persuaded that even the fundamental propositions were known
through the principle of contradiction” (ibid). And since the principle of contra-
diction is what Kant previously calls the “common principle of all analytic judg-
ments”, what the first passage really suggests is (a) that Kant regards himself as
the first to claim that mathematical judgments are synthetic and (b) that he be-
 The passage Cicovacki has in mind is the following from On a discovery: “Leibniz wanted to
refute the empiricism of Locke. For this purpose examples taken from mathematics were well
suited to prove that such cognitions reach much further than empirically acquired concepts
could do, and thereby to defend the a priori origin of the former against Locke’s attacks” (AA
:, first emphasis mine).
64 Brian A. Chance
Authenticated | brianchance@ou.edu author's copy
Download Date | 8/15/15 4:19 PM
lieves all the other “analysts of human reason” regard these judgments as ana-
lytic (AA 4:267). On the plausible assumption that Locke is one of these analysts,
AA 4:268 would seem to suggest that Kant has failed to understand that many
Lockean mathematical judgments are instructive and, hence, more like Kantian
synthetic a priori judgments than analytic a priori ones.
It is perhaps for this reason that the passages in the Essay Kant cites in sup-
port of his claim do not discuss mathematical judgments but instead approach
the notion of instructive knowledge from a different angle:
By contrast I find a hint [Wink] of this division [between analytic and synthetic judgments]
already in Locke’s essays on human understanding. For in Book IV, Chapter III, §9 f., after
he had already discussed the various connections of representations in judgments and the
sources of the connections, of which he located the one in identity or contradiction (ana-
lytic judgments) but the other in the existence of representations in a subject (synthetic
judgments), he then acknowledges in §10 that our cognition (a priori) of these last is
very restricted and almost nothing at all. (Prolegomena, AA 4:270)
Essay 4.3.9 does not discuss ‘identity or disagreement’, so it is likely that Kant
first means to refer us to the previous section of the Essay in which Locke argues
that we have intuitive knowledge of identity and diversity (not contradiction) and
that this knowledge extends “as far […] as our ideas themselves” (Essay 4.3.8).
The reason this knowledge extends so far is that, for any idea, we can immedi-
ately perceive—that is, perceive without the aid of intervening ideas—its identity
with itself and non-identity with all our other ideas. As Locke puts it, “there can
be no idea in the mind, which it does not presently, by intuitive knowledge, per-
ceive to be what it is, and to be different from any other” (ibid).
In §9 Locke then proceeds to discuss the extent of our knowledge concerning
co-existence or necessary connection, the second of the four knowable agree-
ments discussed in section two. He writes that our knowledge of this kind of
agreement is “very short” despite the fact that this kind of knowledge constitutes
“the greatest and most material part of our knowledge concerning substances”
(Essay 4.3.9). The reason our knowledge of coexistence is very short is twofold.
First, most of it consists merely in knowledge of the nominal essences of species
of substances, and this knowledge is trifling by the standards Locke will intro-
duce in Essay 4.8. Second, any other knowledge of coexistence we might have
concerning species of substances would require the perception of agreement
or disagreement in coexistence of the complex idea of a species of substance
and some other idea not contained in it, and such knowledge “however weighty
and considerable a part soever of Humane Science, is yet very narrow, and scarce
any at all” (Essay 4.3.10, my emphasis). The reason such knowledge is so scarce,
Locke continues, is:
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[…] that the simple Ideas whereof our complex Ideas of Substances are made up, are, for the
most part such, as carry with them, in their own Nature, no visible necessary connection, or
inconsistency with any other simple Ideas, whose co-existence with them we would inform
ourselves about” (ibid, third emphasis mine).
In these passages, Locke clearly indicates that there is a limited sort of knowl-
edge about the co-existence of qualities in substances that is distinct from our
knowledge of the nominal essences of the kinds those substances may fall
under, and it is this knowledge that Kant refers to in the passage from the Pro-
legomena we have been examining.³³
Moreover, when we consider the examples of these propositions Locke gives,
one of them does seem like a good candidate for a synthetic a priori claim:
Indeed, some few of the primary Qualities have a necessary dependence, and visible Con-
nexion one with another, as Figure necessarily supposes Extension, receiving or communi-
cating Motion by impulse, supposes Solidity. But though these, and perhaps some others of
our Ideas have [a visible connection with another]: yet there are so few of them, that have a
visible Connexion one with another, that we can by Intuition and Demonstration, discover
the co-existence of very few of the Qualities [that] are to be found united in Substances: and
we are left only to the assistance of our Senses, to make know to us, what Qualities they
contain. (Essay 4.3.14)
Given that Locke has previously characterized our idea of figure as a modifica-
tion of our idea of extension, the first example he lists does not serve his
point.³⁴ The second claim, however, that “receiving or communicating motion
by impulse, supposes solidity”, is a claim asserting a necessary connection be-
tween two primary qualities that does not appear to follow from a mere analysis
of their contents. To be sure, in his discussion of the idea of solidity, Locke does
claim that the “mutual impulse” of bodies depends on their solidity, but there is
nothing in his discussion to indicate that this claim is made on the basis of a
mere analysis of the idea of solidity, so this discussion is consistent with his
 Although Kant does not refer to them, it is worth noting that there are other passages in the
Essay in which Locke appears to acknowledge the existence of knowledge of this sort. In Essay
.., for example, he writes that our complex ideas of substances are “such combinations of
simples ones, as carry not with them any discoverable connection or repugnancy, but with a
very few other Ideas” (my underlining). And in reference to the chapter of the Essay we have
been discussing, he comments in the next section that we can “go but a very little way” in dis-
covering the “natural dependence” between the primary qualities of substances, which implies
that we can go some way in discovering these dependencies. Similar claims can be found at
Essay .. and ...
 See Essay ..–.
66 Brian A. Chance
Authenticated | brianchance@ou.edu author's copy
Download Date | 8/15/15 4:19 PM
claim in the above passage that there is a perceivable and hence knowable nec-
essary connection between the solidity of a substance and its ability to receive
and communicate motion that is not merely a matter of unpacking the content
of the complex idea of some species of substance (Essay 2.4.5).
What is more, when we consider what Locke means by solidity, this property
of body turns out to be quite similar to the repulsive or expansive force Kant as-
cribes to matter in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (hereafter
Metaphysical Foundations) and that he holds is a necessary condition of its re-
ceiving or communicating motion. According to Locke, solidity is “that which
[…] hinders the approach of two bodies, when they are moving towards each
other” in the same way in which the chair on which I am currently sitting hinders
the downward movement of my body (Essay 2.4.1). Similarly, Kant holds that all
matter has a repulsive force, which is “that by which a matter can be the cause of
others removing themselves from it (or, what is the same, by which it resists the
approach of others to it)” (AA 4:498). Since this force is a necessary condition for
the existence of matter, it is a fortiori a necessary condition for matter’s receiving
or communicating motion (cf. AA 4:510).³⁵ And since the strategy of the Meta-
physical Foundations is to apply the principles of the Transcendental Aesthetic
and Transcendental Analytic of the first Critique to the empirical concept of mat-
ter in order to determine what, given these principles, is necessarily true of mat-
ter, Kant regards the conclusions he reaches about matter in the Metaphysical
Foundations as synthetic a priori cognition.³⁶
Thus, it is Locke’s views on body and bodily motion that lead Kant to claim
in the Prolegomena that Locke anticipates his notion of synthetic a priori cogni-
tion; and these views are, moreover, ones that appear to agree at least in the
main with views Kant himself holds and that he would later articulate in theMet-
aphysical Foundations, a book that appeared in print three years after the pas-
sage from the Prolegomena we have been examining. Whether Kant understood
Locke’s claim about solidity to be an example of instructive knowledge, however,
is difficult to determine, in part because Locke does not use the term in the pas-
 For a more detailed discussion of this part of the Metaphysical Foundations, see Warren
(). In drawing the comparison between Locke and Kant in the way I have, I depart from
Warren’s characterization of Locke’s idea of solidity,which Warren takes to be the idea of a prop-
erty and not a power of body.While resolving this question is not necessary for my purposes, it
seems to me that the distinction Locke draws between solidity and hardness at Essay .. jus-
tifies treating solidity as a kind of power, as do the similarities between Locke’s examples in this
section and the examples Kant uses to illustrate the impenetrability of matter at AA :.
 For a general presentation of the argument of the Metaphysical Foundations along these
lines, see Guyer (, –).
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sages from the Essay Kant cites. Regardless of the state of Kant’s understanding
of Locke, however, it does appear that Locke understood his claim about solidity
to be instructive knowledge, so while the argument of this section makes clear
that Kant’s justification for his claim about Locke is quite different from the
one I provided in section two, it also provides additional support for the argu-
ment of that section.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have attempted to shed light on three sets of issues that bear di-
rectly on our understanding of Kant and Locke and on their relationship to one
another. The first is whether Kant believes Locke merely anticipates his distinc-
tion between analytic and synthetic judgments or whether he also believes Locke
anticipates the epistemological notion central to Kant’s project in the first Cri-
tique, the notion of synthetic a priori cognition. The second is what we as readers
of Kant and Locke should think about this question, and the third is the nature of
Kant’s justification for the comparison he draws between his philosophy and
Locke’s.
In regard to the first, I have argued that Kant’s comments in the Prolegomena
are clear evidence that he believes Locke anticipates both the analytic-synthetic
distinction and Kant’s notion of synthetic a priori cognition and that Kant’s sub-
sequent comments in On a discovery, when understood in light of the details of
his dispute with Eberhard, do not provide any evidence that Kant changed his
mind about this question.
In regard to the second, I have argued that the best justification for Kant’s
claim draws on Locke’s distinction between trifling and instructive knowledge
and that the arguments against this claim by Carson, Allison, and Newman
fail to hit their marks. The concerns about Locke’s account of mathematical judg-
ments raised by Carson are more relevant to the application of these judgments
to objects encountered in experience than to their apriority. Allison’s suggestion
that Kant would have regarded some of Locke’s trifling propositions as synthetic
is belied by the similarities between these propositions and Kant’s examples of a
priori judgments involving empirical concepts. And the distinction Newman
wishes to draw between ideational and epistemic containment, while consistent
with Locke’s discussion of the trifling-instructive distinction, is not entailed by it.
In regard to the third, I have argued that Kant’s own justification for his
claim is rather different than many commentators have thought it was (or should
have been). It is clear that Kant does not appeal to the features of Lockean math-
ematical judgment to justify his claim, but the reason he does not is not, as Ci-
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covacki claims, that he believes Locke holds these judgments to be synthetic a
posteriori but rather that he thinks Locke holds them to be analytic a priori.
Moreover, the parallels between Locke’s views and the synthetic a priori to
which Kant draws our attention concern our knowledge of the nature of bodies;
and while it does appear that Locke regards the very limited knowledge we can
have about the co-existence of ideas in substances over and above our knowl-
edge of the elements of our complex ideas of those substances as a kind of in-
structive knowledge, there is no direct evidence that Kant was aware of Locke’s
instructive-trifling distinction or that it played a role in his own understanding of
his complex relationship to Locke.³⁷
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